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PHILIP B. STARK*
Abstract. As part of its defense of the Child Online Protection Act, which seeks to prevent
minors from viewing commercially published harmful-to-minors material on the World
Wide Web, the U.S. Department of Justice commissioned a study of the prevalence of
"adult" materials and the effectiveness of Internet content filters in blocking them. As of
2005-2006, about i.a% of webpages indexed by Google and MSN were adult-hundreds of
millions of pages. About 6% of a set of 1.3 billion searches executed on AOL, MSN and
Yahoo! in Summer 2005 retrieved at least one adult webpage among the first ten results,
and about 1.7% of those results are adult webpages. These estimates are based on both
simple random samples of webpages indexed by search engines and on a stratified random
sample of searches. Webpages with sexually explicit content intended for adult
entertainment (i.e., not in an educational, medical or artistic context) were used to test a
variety of Internet content filters for underblocking-failing to block webpages that they are
intended to block. A random sample of "clean" webpages with no sexual content or
reference to sex was used to test the filters for overblocking-blocking webpages they are
not intended to block. Webpages retrieved by the most popular searches according to
Wordtracker were also categorized and used to test filters. Generally, filters with lower
rates of underblocking had higher rates of overblocking. If the filters most effective at
blocking adult materials were applied to search indexes, typical query results, or the results
of popular queries, the number of clean pages blocked in error would exceed the number of
adult pages blocked correctly.
* Professor in the Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley. This work
was supported by the United States Department of Justice. I testified on behalf of the
United States at trial in Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D.
Pa. 2007), and submitted expert declarations in the related matter of Gonzales v. Google,
234 F.R.D. 674, 688 (N.D. Ca. 2006). Much of the data collection was performed by a
group led by Paul Mewett at CRA International. I am grateful to David Freedman, Raphael
Gomez, Theodore Hirt, Joel McElvain and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations
or comments on an earlier draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") was enacted
by Congress in 1998,1 it has yet to be enforced. COPA provides:
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of
the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of
the World Wide Web, makes any communication for
commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined
not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6
months, or both.2
COPA does not restrict material with literary, artistic or educational
value for minors;3 the statute does contain exemptions for Internet
Service Providers ("ISP"s) and search engine companies.4 The law
allows an affirmative defense: if the publisher uses an "age screen" to
keep minors away from the material, he is not liable.5 Requiring users
to provide a valid credit card number also suffices to satisfy the "age
screen" requirement. 6
COPA is the second law Congress has passed to protect children on
the Internet.7 The first was the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional, in part, because it
was overly broad.8 COPA has a narrower scope. It focuses on the
I Child Online Protection Act, Public Law 105-277, U.S. Statutes at Large 112 (1998):
2681-736.
2 Ibid., § 1403, 2681-736.
3 Ibid., 2681-739.
4 Ibid., 2681-737.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004).
8 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-561, 11o Stat. 133-43
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (2000)); Communications
Decency Act of 1996, Public Law 104-104, U.S. Statutes at Large 11o (1996): 133-43
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (2000); Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at
661 (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
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World Wide Web rather than on all interactive computer
communication and only restricts commercial publishers.9
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and other plaintiffs
filed suit in district court challenging COPA on constitutional grounds
on October 22, 1998, the day after it was signed.1° Among other
things, plaintiffs argued that Internet content filtering is a less
restrictive means of achieving the government's (legitimate) goal of
protecting minors." The government was enjoined from enforcing
COPA as passed.12 The Department of Justice appealed the
injunction. The matter has now been considered by the United States
Supreme Court twice.13 In the second case, the Supreme Court upheld
the injunction preventing the enforcement of COPA pending
adjudication of the constitutionality of the Act.4 Citing the rapid pace
of change in technology and the web as well as "a serious gap in the
evidence as to the effectiveness of filtering software," the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the District court in 2004 so that the
parties could "update and supplement the factual record to reflect
current technological realities."15
Studies have recommended the use of Internet content filters as
one of many tools to help protect children.16  Previous empirical
studies of the effectiveness of Internet content filters used to block
objectionable material on the World Wide Web relied on small
samples of convenience, rather than random samples from some
larger universe of webpages.17 As a consequence, the findings of those
9 Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 661, 779.
lo Ibid., 663.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. 656; Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. 564.
'4Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 672-73.
15 Ibid., 671-72.
16 Commission on Online Child Protection, "Report to Congress-October 2o, 2000", 19-
22, http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf; Dick Thornburgh and
Herbert S. Lin, eds., Youth, Pornography, and the Internet (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 2002), 267-303.
17 E.g., eTesting Labs, "Corporate Content Filtering Performance and Effectiveness
Testing," http://web.archive.org/web/2oo3o4o6232751/Vww.websense.com/
whyqualitymatters/etestinglabs-fullreport.pdf, 14-19; eTesting Labs, "U.S. Department of
STARK2008]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
studies cannot be extrapolated reliably beyond the samples they
tested.18 Moreover, the independent tests of filters that had been
conducted in the previous few years were consumer reviews, not
scientific studies.19
To fill the gap in the evidence regarding filtering software, the
Department of Justice commissioned a study of the performance of
filters. The study was also designed to determine whether "adult"
webpages were hosted in the U.S. or abroad because the presence of
commercial ties between foreign-hosted commercial providers of
pornography and the U.S. affects methods of enforcement available. I
was involved in the design of the study, data collection and analysis.
Ultimately, I testified about the study at trial. This paper presents
both the results of the study and some of the technical details.
The case was tried on its merits between October 23 and
November 20, 2006 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by Senior
Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr.20  Judge Reed issued a permanent
injunction enjoining the government from enforcing COPA in a
decision announced on March 22, 2007.21 Among the reasons for his
decision, Judge Reed included: "defendant has failed to meet his
burden of showing that COPA is the least restrictive and most effective
alternative in achieving the compelling interest [of protecting children
Justice: Updated Web Content Filtering Software Comparison,"
http://www.surfonthesafeside.com/aboutcic/usdoj.pdf), 6-7; Paul Greenfield, Peter
Rickwood, and Huu Cuong Tran, "Effectiveness of Internet Filtering Software Products,"
CSIRO, 23, http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/aba/newspubs/documents/
filtereffectiveness.pdf.
18 See, e.g., William G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques, 3rd ed. (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1977), io; Shari Seidman Diamond, "Reference Guide on Survey Research," in
Reference Manual on Scientific Research, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial
Center, 2000), 242-44; Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1965), 19.
19 E.g., "Filtering Software: Better, But Still Fallible," ConsumerReports.org, June 2005,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/electronics-computers/resource-center/internet-
filtering-software-6o5/overview/index.htm (accessed March 19, 20o8); Jay Munro,
"Editor's Choice: Cybersitter 9.o," PCMag.com, August 3, 2004, http://www.pcmag.com/
article2/o%2C27o4%2C161883o%2Coo.asp (accessed March 19, 2008).
20 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
21 Ibid., 821.
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from sexually explicit material on the Web]."22 The Department of
Justice appealed this decision on September 17, 2007.23
How effective are Internet content filters at blocking adult
materials on the World Wide Web?24 To answer that question
quantitatively requires a precise definition of "effective." Internet
content filters make two kinds of errors: i) blocking a page that should
not be blocked, called overblocking, and 2) failing to block a page that
should be blocked, called underblocking.25 Measuring underblocking
and overblocking separately is important to understanding how well
filters work. Single-number summaries of accuracy ("the filter is
99.9% accurate") are virtually meaningless. A filter that does nothing
at all has 99.9% accuracy on a test set that contains 1,ooo webpages,
999 of which should not be blocked. But it misses loo% of the pages
that should be blocked.
Errors are more likely for some pages than for others:
overblocking and underblocking rates depend on the webpages used
for testing. What is a reasonable set of webpages for testing filters?
For the purpose of protecting children, it would help to know what
webpages children attempt to view. In principle, one could monitor
the web browsing behavior of a large random sample of children in
various age groups to see what webpages they come across, and then
test filters on those pages. To the best of my knowledge, such data do
not exist and would be extremely expensive-if not impossible-to
collect.26 To test the effectiveness of Internet content filters, the study
22 ibid.
23 Brief for the Appellant, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, No. 07-2539 (3rd Cir.
Sept., 2007).
24 Internet content filters may also restrict access to other content and services on the
Internet-the focus here is on browsing the World Wide Web, the scope of COPA. One
should be skeptical of manufacturers' claims about the performance of Internet content
filters: "Filter vendors sometimes provide estimates of overblock and underblock rates, but
without knowing the methodology underlying these estimates, the cautious user must be
concerned that the methodology is selected to minimize these rates." Thornburgh and Lin,
Youth, Pornography, and the Internet, 277.
25 Plaintiffs and their experts argued that only underblocking matters. Gonzales at 794.
Whatever merit this might have as a legal argument, it makes little sense scientifically. If
all that matters is underblocking, one can simply turn off the computer. No objectionable
material will be displayed: the underblocking rate is zero. But, the overblocking is
draconian.
26 The government obtained data from a company that studies individual web browsing
behavior, but the quality of the data was poor and the sample size was small. The test sets
used in the present study attempt to "bracket" the collection of webpages minors are likely
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used several complementary sets of webpages derived from search
providers and a company that reports search behavior. Individuals'
experience of the World Wide Web is largely mediated by search
engines: according to Wordtracker reports, "google" and "yahoo" are
among the most common search queries.27 This indicates that people
even use search engines to find search engines by name, instead of
typing the address of the search engine into the web browser.
When a search engine receives a query, it retrieves results from a
catalog of webpages called an index. Each search engine has its own
index, and the major search providers add and remove webpages from
their indexes regularly to keep them up to date. Providers also record
the queries that they receive.28 Search providers dedicate staggering
amounts of resources to creating and maintaining their indexes; this
includes figuring out which webpages users want to see. Only a
fraction of the World Wide Web is indexed by search engines, but it is
the most accessible part, comprising tens of billions of pages, and it is
the entry point for most people. The set of webpages indexed by
search engines is both the most accessed and accessible and thus
comprises a reasonable set of webpages to test filters.
However, just because a webpage is in a search index does not
guarantee that the webpage will be seen by anyone. The webpages
returned when actual queries are entered into a search engine are a
better measure of what people see and how often they see it. Of those,
the webpages that appear on the first page of results are those most
frequently viewed. For the Google, MSN, and Yahoo! search engines,
the first page shows approximately the first ten results of each search.
to encounter. The sets contain the webpages minors are most likely to encounter
frequently, although possibly in different proportions. There would need to be something
quite peculiar about the mix of webpages minors encounter for filters to perform well on
that mix but poorly on the test sets. Regardless, the test sets in this study provide
complementary slices through the indexed portion of the World Wide Web, reasonable sets
on which to test filters.
27 Wordtracker markets lists of the most popular search terms, collected from Dogpile.com
and MetaCrawler, "meta search" services that send users' queries to a variety of search
engines-including MSN, Yahoo!, Google, and Ask.com. Lists of the Wordtracker Top 500
Search Engine Keywords of the Week can be found at
http://www.searchengineguide.com/wt/.
28 The queries can include some information that could identify the user, such as the user's
IP address and "cookies." Different search providers retain different pieces of information
for different periods of time. For this study, the Department of Justice requested that the
search providers not supply any information that could identify the individual who ran the
search.
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The first ten results of actual queries typed into search engines are a
second reasonable set of webpages to test filters.
Many queries are rare. The webpages they return might not be
viewed by many users. In contrast, the first ten webpages returned by
extremely popular queries comprise a third test set: webpages many
users see. One would expect filters to perform best for this set,
because overblocking or underblocking those webpages would quickly
generate a large number of customer complaints.
These three sets of webpages-those indexed by search engines,
the first ten results of searches, and the first ten results of the most
popular searches-are different slices of the World Wide Web. They
provide complementary universes on which to test Internet content
filters. If filters performed well on any of them, one might wonder
whether filters perform well on the particular mix of webpages
children tend to encounter. We shall see that filters do not perform
very well on any of these sets, and, hence, not on mixtures of the
three. As a result, it is highly implausible that filters protect minors
effectively.
II. DATA
The study used data collected in 2005 and 2006. Through
subpoena, the government obtained a random sample of 50,000
webpages from the Google search index and a random sample of 1
million webpages from the MSN search index.29 I drew random sub-
samples of 50,000 webpages from the MSN index and 11,ooo
webpages from the Google index.
The government also obtained a week of search queries from AOL,
MSN, and Yahoo! by subpoena.3O There were approximately 1.3
29 The MSN sample was drawn in November 2005 and the Google sample was drawn in
March 2oo6. I worked with Microsoft and Google to find mutually acceptable methods to
draw the samples and I generated the random numbers used to draw the samples. Yahoo!
also provided I million webpages from its index, but those data were not reliable enough to
use: two domains-www.cracks.me.uk and the anesthesiology department at the University
of Washington-comprised about 5% of the Yahoo! sample. At the time,
www.cracks.me.uk had a sexually explicit banner ad. (A domain is the "root" of a web
address. For example, statistics.berkeley.edu is a domain;
statistics.berkeley.edu/-stark/index.html is one of the pages in that domain.)
30 See footnote 28 above. The queries were from 2005: AOL from July 22-28, MSN from
July 17-23, and Yahoo! from August 18-24. The AOL and MSN queries had weights,
which appear to be the number of times each query was run each day. Protective orders
prevent me from listing the number of queries each search provider produced. Problems
decompressing the AOL data resulted in the exclusion of 0.6% of the searches; those data
would not have a material effect on the estimates. To protect the data providers, separate
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billion searches in all. Google, Yahoo!, MSN and AOL have the bulk of
the search market, although AOL does not have its own search
engine.31 I drew a stratified random sample of the queries comprising
7,541 queries with total weight 15,461.
The random samples of webpages and queries were sent to CRA
International, along with a list of 685 of the most popular searches
from November 12, 2005 through February 20, 2oo6, according to
Wordtracker.32 A team at CRA International led by Paul Mewett
attempted to view and classify 39,999 random webpages from the
MSN index, 11,ooo random webpages from the Google index, the first
ten results of each of the randomly selected searches and the first ten
results of the 685 Wordtracker searches.33
The classification scheme was nuanced so that alternative
definitions of "harmful to minors" could be applied. For the present
paper, only two categories matter: category la ("clean") and category
5f ("adult"). Category la webpages contain no reference to sex and no
nudity. Category 5f webpages are "adult entertainment." The two
categories are disjointed but not exhaustive. For example, a webpage
that shows genitalia in an artistic or educational context would be in
some other category.34  In all, CRA International attempted to
categorize 68,15o webpages. Of those, 5,045 were no longer working.
Of the 63,105 webpages that were working at the time of testing,
6o,833 were category la and 1,382 were category 5f. The remaining
89o were in other categories.
CRA International determined the country in which each adult
webpage was hosted. For foreign adult webpages that did not require
payment, CRA International looked for commercial ties to the U.S.
such as advertisements or links to commercial websites hosted in the
U.S. Finally, CRA International tested whether a variety of Internet
estimates for the three providers were not reported. The government issued a subpoena to
Google for queries, but Google refused. The issue was litigated; Google was compelled to
provide a random sample of URLs from its index, but no search queries. Gonzales v.
Google, 234 F.R.D. 674, 688 (N.D. Cal. 2oo6).
31 It is my understanding that at the time, Google processed searches for AOL, and that the
same query executed directly on Google or through AOL produced very similar results.
32 See note 27 above.
33 MSN queries were run on the MSN search engine, Yahoo! queries on the Yahoo! search
engine, AOL queries on the Google search engine, and Wordtracker queries on
Metacrawler. If a query retrieved fewer than ten results, all results were used.
34 COPA does not restrict such materials. See note 3 above.
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content filters blocked each of the adult webpages and a random
sample of the clean webpages.35 CRA International tested 15
combinations of filters and filter settings. The tests, run in the spring
and summer of 2006, used the (then) latest version of each filter, with
all updates included. The settings were either the default, settings
intended for teenagers, or the settings the manufacturers' instructions
indicated were tailored most narrowly to block pornography. Some of
the filters were client-side programs; three (AOL, MSN, and Verizon)
were services provided by ISPs.
CRA International sent me a database that classified webpages by
content. The database showed which webpages were used to test each
filter and whether those webpages were blocked. It also gave the
country of origin of the category 5f webpages, and, for foreign "free"
adult webpages, whether the page had commercial ties to the U.S.
That database is the basis of all the estimates in this article.36
Throughout this article, "adult" means material CRA International
would put in category 5f, and "clean" means material CRA
International would put in category la. A webpage is "domestic" if
CRA International would identify its host country to be the U.S. A
foreign adult webpage has commercial ties to the U.S. if CRA
International would say it does.
III. RESULTS
The results are presented in tables 1 through 9. Table 1 lists the
sizes of the populations and samples in the study. Table 2 gives
estimates of the percentage of adult (category 5f) and clean (category
la) webpages in the universes of study. Table 3 gives conservative
lower 95% confidence bounds on the percentage of adult webpages in
the Google and MSN search indexes, and the percentage of webpages
in those indexes that are adult webpages hosted in the U.S. Table 4
gives estimates of overblocking and underblocking of webpages in the
Google and MSN search indexes. Table 5 gives lower 95% confidence
limits for the entries in Table 4. Table 6 gives estimates of the
percentage of adult webpages in search engine indexes that filters do
not block that are hosted in the U.S.
35 They sent me a list of all category ia webpages; I drew random samples and sent them
back to CRA International.
36 1 checked the internal consistency of the data, but beyond that, I did not verify the work
cRA International performed.
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Table 7 gives estimates of overblocking and underblocking for AOL,
MSN and Yahoo! searches, by result and by search, and lower
confidence limits on the percentage of searches that return at least
one adult webpage that is not blocked. Table 8 reports underblocking
and estimated overblocking for Wordtracker searches, by result and
by search. Finally, Table 9 gives estimates of the percentage of
nominally free adult webpages hosted abroad that have commercial
ties to the U.S.
IV. TECHNICAL DETAILS
The estimates of the prevalence of adult webpages and of the rates
at which filters fail to block adult webpages and block clean webpages
have downward biases. For example, searches that did not retrieve
any working webpages were included in the denominator of estimates
of the prevalence of adult material. Category 5f is very restrictive:
there must be sexual content that is clearly adult entertainment, and
that content must be visible without clicking anything, including the
"play" button of a video. Category la is also quite restrictive: there can
be no nudity or sexual content whatsoever, not even in a medical,
educational or artistic context. Those restrictions make it easier for
filters to classify the webpages correctly. Months passed between
collecting the webpages and testing the filters, which allowed time for
the filter companies to classify the pages correctly.37
The Wordtracker queries are a population of queries: the
measured prevalence of adult materials and the overblocking and
underblocking rates for Wordtracker search results are essentially
parameters rather than estimates.38 In contrast, the samples of
webpages from the Google and MSN search indexes and the samples
of queries from AOL, MSN and Yahoo! are random samples from the
corresponding populations of queries. I used sample percentages to
estimate the percentage of adult webpages in the Google and MSN
indexes, the percentage of adult webpages that originate in the United
States, and overblocking and underblocking rates for webpages. The
sample percentages are unbiased.
Because the sampling fractions are minute, the number of items in
the sample with a given property has essentially a binomial
37 See notes 29 and 30 above. Filters were tested in spring and summer 2006.
38 Overblocking was estimated from a random sample of search results to save labor. A
query run on a single search engine at two different times does not necessarily retrieve
identical results; this could contribute a small amount of variability to the blocking rates.
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distribution-the exact distribution is hypergeometric. The binomial
approximation yields conservative confidence limits. I used the
binomial distribution to find the lower 95% confidence limits in
Tables 3, 5, and 7.39
I used weighted sample percentages to estimate the percentage of
AOL, MSN and Yahoo! searches that had various properties. There
were two sets of weights. AOL and MSN each provided weights that
were apparently the daily frequencies of each query. Those weights
were used to make estimates for the two services' searches. The
overall estimates for the population of 1.3 billion searches were a
weighted average of estimates for the vendors separately. The weights
in the average were the fractions of searches the services contributed
to the total pool. The resulting weighted sample percentages are ratio
estimators, which may be biased, although I expect the bias to be
small because the sample sizes are moderate.40
The exact probability distribution of the weighted sample
percentage is not computable in this problem. To have conservative-
rather than approximate-lower confidence bounds required basing
the bounds on something other than weighted sample percentages.
The Wordtracker, AOL and MSN query data show that searches that
retrieve adult webpages have higher than average weight.41 Therefore,
treating every query from a given search provider as having the same
weight introduces a negative bias in estimates of the prevalence of
adult materials. For each vendor, a conservative lower confidence
bound based on the sample percentage without weights would,
therefore, be lower than a bound that used the weights. I inverted
39 The parameter n in the binomial distribution is equal to the sample size and the
parameter p is equal to the proportion of items in the parent population that have the
property. The lower confidence limit is the smallest population proportion p such that the
chance of observing a sample proportion at least as large as was observed is at least 5%.
The limits are conditional on the number of working URLs in each sample. See, e.g., E. L.
Lehmann and Joseph P. Romano, Testing Statistical Hypotheses, 3rd ed. (New York:
Springer, 2005), 75. Lehmann and Romano compute analogous upper confidence limits.
40 For example, for each vendor, the estimated percentage of queries that return at least
one adult webpage was estimated as (total weight of queries in the sample that return at
least one adult webpage)/(total weight of queries in the sample) x lOO%. Both the
numerator and denominator are random. The expected value of a ratio is not generally
equal to the ratio of the expected values, which introduces a bias of order 1/n, where n is
the sample size. The variance is of order 1/n V2, so for large samples the variance dominates
the bias. See, e.g., Cochran, Sampling Techniques, 16o-62; Kish, Survey Sampling, 186.
4 I computed the average weights using the query data. The average weight was larger for
the queries that retrieved adult pages.
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binomial tests to find lower confidence limits (at level (0.95)1/3) for
each set of searches, then formed a weighted average of those
confidence limits using as weights the fractions of searches the
vendors contributed to the pool. Since the samples are independent,
combining the confidence bounds this way is conservative: the overall
confidence level is higher than 95%.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This study reports on webpages drawn from the Google and MSN
indexes, AOL, MSN and Yahoo! search results, and results of 685 of
the most popular searches according to Wordtracker. Data were
collected in 2005 and 2oo6. Fifteen combinations of Internet content
filters and filter settings were tested on the webpages in 2oo6.
About 1.1% of the webpages in the MSN and Google search indexes
are "adult entertainment" (CRA International category 50. Since the
indexed portion of the web contains tens of billions of pages, 1.1%
amounts to hundreds of millions of adult webpages. About 1.7% of
AOL, MSN and Yahoo! search results were adult, as were about 14% of
the results of the Wordtracker searches. A substantial percentage of
adult webpages are hosted in the U.S.: about 44% of those in the
Google index, 56% of those in the MSN index, 88% of those in the
sample of search results, and 87% of those in the Wordtracker search
results. About 6% of AOL, MSN and Yahoo! searches and 37% of the
Wordtracker searches retrieve at least one adult webpage among the
first ten results.
Filters vary widely in their performance, and there is a tradeoff
between failing to block adult materials ("underblocking") and
erroneously blocking clean materials ("overblocking"). Filters that
block a large percentage of adult webpages also block a sizeable
percentage of clean webpages in error. For example, the most
restrictive filter blocked about 91% of the adult webpages in the
Google and MSN search indexes, but also blocked about 23-24% of
the clean webpages in the indexes. On average, if that filter were
applied to every webpage in the Google search index, the filter would
erroneously block about 22.1 clean webpages for each adult page it
blocks correctly.42 For the MSN search index, it would block about
42 An estimated 98.1% of the webpages in the Google index are clean and 1.1% are adult
(Table 2). The MSN filter at the Mature Teen setting blocks an estimated 22.6% of clean
webpages and (loo% - 8.9%) = 91.1% of adult webpages (Table 4). The estimated
percentage of webpages in the Google index that are clean and blocked in error is (98.1% x
22.6%) = 22.171%, and the estimated percentage of webpages in the Google index that are
adult and blocked correctly is (1.1% x 91.1%) = 1.002%. The ratio is 22.171%/1.002% =
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23.1 clean webpages erroneously for each adult webpage it blocked
correctly. Less restrictive filters blocked as little as 40% of the adult
webpages in the indexes and fewer total clean pages in error.
The performance of filters on search results is qualitatively
similar. The most restrictive filter blocked about 94% of the adult
webpages among search results, but erroneously blocked about 13% of
clean search results. On average, it would block about 7.6 clean search
results in error for every adult search result it blocks correctly. For
the most popular searches, the most restrictive filter blocked over 98%
of adult results, but also blocked nearly 20% of clean results. On
average, the filter blocked about 1.1 clean results of popular searches
erroneously for each adult result it blocked correctly.
These figures have biases in favor of filters: underblocking was
measured using webpages that were unambiguously "adult
entertainment" pages; overblocking was measured using webpages
that had no nudity or sexual reference whatsoever, and a time lag of
months between collecting the webpages and testing the filters gave
the filters an advantage.
The amount of adult material on the World Wide Web is vast:
there are hundreds of millions of webpages in the indexed web alone.
Filters can reduce the amount of adult material children come in
contact with, but they are far from perfect. Millions of adult webpages
slip through even the most restrictive filters, which block an even
greater number of webpages that they should not block.
Table 1. Sizes of populations and samples in the study. Numbers for
searches are weight d by the frequ ncy of the searches.
Google index MSN index AOL, MSN, Word-
and Yahoo! tracker
searches searches
Webpages in sample 11,100 39,999 22,405 2o6
million
Working webpages 10,009 36,557 21,870 195
in sample million
Searches in 1.3 billion 20.6
population million
Searches in sample 2,345 20.6
million
22.1. The calculations for the MSN index and the results of AOL, MSN, Yahoo!, and
Wordtracker searches are analogous.
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Table 2. Estimated prevalence of "adult" (category 5f) and "clean"
(category 1a) webpages. Column 2: estimates for the Google search
index. Column 3: estimates for the MSN search index. Column 4:
estimates for the first ten results of searches on AOL, MSN, and
Yahoo!. Column 5: estimates for the first ten results of Wordtracker's
most popular searches. The first row contains the estimated
percentage of webpages that are adult. The second row contains, of
the adult webpages, the estimated percentage that are domestic. The
third row contains the estimated percentage of searches that return at
least one adult webpage among the first ten results. The fourth row
contains the estimated percentage of searches that return at least one
domestic adult webpage among the first ten results. Estimates for the
Google and MSN indexes and the AOL, MSN and Yahoo! searches are
based on random samples. Figures for Wordtracker are based on 685
of the most popular searches for November 12, 2005 through
February 20, 2006.
Source Google index MSN index AOL, MSN, Word-
and Yahoo! tracker
searches searches
Adult webpages 1.1% 1.1% 1.7% 14.1%
Domestic adult 44.2% 56.7% 88.4% 87.4%
webpages
Searches with adult 6.o% 37.1%
results
Searches with 5.7% 37.0%
domestic adult
results
Clean webpages 98.1% 98.3% 97.5% 76.5%
Table 3. Conservative 95% lower confidence limits for the prevalence
of "adult" (category 50 webpages. The second and third columns
contain lower confidence limits for the percentage of adult webpages
and of domestic adult webpages among all webpages in the Google
and MSN indexes. The fourth column contains lower confidence
limits for the percentage of the AOL, MSN and Yahoo! searches that
return at least one adult webpage and for the percentage of AOL, MSN
and Yahoo! searches that return at least one domestic adult webpage.
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Google index MSN index AOL, MSN, andi Yahoo! searches
Adult 1.0% 1.o% 2.5%
Domestic adult 0.4% 0.5% 2.2%
Table 4. Estimated underblocking and overblocking of webpages in
the Google and MSN indexes. Among adult (category 50 webpages,
the percentage that are not blocked by a filter is the rate of
underblocking. Among clean (category ia) webpages, the percentage
that are blocked by a filter is the rate of overbIocking.
Filter Underblocking Overblocking
Google MSN Google MSN
AOL Mature Teen 8.9% 8.6% 22.6% 23.6%
MSN Pornography 16.8% 18.7% 19.6% 10.3%
MSN Teen 17.7% 20.5% 21.9% 18.9%
ContentProtect Default 38.3% 45.4% 2.8% 3.0%
ContentProtect Custom 28.3% 46.7% 1.4% 0.7%
CyberPatrol Custom 31.0% 33.5% 1.4% 0.9%
CyberSitter Default 12.7% 16.5% 3.6% 4.1%
CyberSitter Custom 12.4% 18.9% 4.0% 3.7%
McAfee Young Teen 16.1% 26.0% 12.4% 13.2%
Net Nanny Level 2 44.0% 46.1% 3.3% 2.2%
Norton Default 60.2% 54.9% 1.4% 0.7%
Norton Custom 58.4% 54.2% 0.9% 0.4%
Verizon 41.8% 40.3% 9.4% 5.7%
8e6 18.3% 23.0% 9.4% 7.5%
SafeEyes 16.2% 15.2% 3.3% 3.2%
Table 5. Conservative 95% lower confidence limits for underblocking
and overblocking of webpages in search indexes. For illustration, at
95% confidence, the MSN filter at the "Teen" setting fails to block at
least 12.8% of the adult (category 5f) webpages in the Google index.
Similarly, at 95% confidence, the MSN Teen filter blocks at least 16.6%
of the clean (category 1a) webpages in the MSN index.
Filter Underblocking Overblocking
Google MSN Google MSN
AOL Mature Teen 5.6% 6.5% 18.4% 21.0%
MSN Pornography 12.1% 15.7% 15.8% 8.5%
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Underblocking Overblocking
MSN Teen 12.8% 17.4% 17.8% 16.6%
ContentProtect Default 31.3% 41.3% 1.5% 2.1%
ContentProtect Custom 22.2% 42.6% o.6% 0.4%
CyberPatrol Custom 24.6% 29.7% 0.6% 0.5%
CyberSitter Default 8.6% 13.6% 2.1% 3.1%
CyberSitter Custom 8.4% 15.9% 2.4% 2.7%
McAfee Young Teen 11.4% 22.5% 9.3% 11.3%
Net Nanny Level 2 36.8% 41.9% 1.9% 1.5%
Norton Default 52.9% 50.7% o.6% 0.4%
Norton Custom 51.1% 50.1% 0.4% 0.2%
Verizon 34.7% 36.2% 6.7% 4.4%
8e6 13.1% 19.6% 6.7% 6.o%
SafeEyes 11.4% 12.3% 1.9% 2.3%
Table 6. Domestic underblocking. Of the adult
webpages in the Google and MSN indexes that filters do
estimated percentage that are domestic webnaees.
Filter Estimated Domestic
Underblocking
Google MSN
AOL Mature Teen 40.0% 40.6%
MSN Pornography 31.6% 42.9%
MSN Teen 40.0% 37.7%
ContentProtect Default 39.0% 45.8%
ContentProtect Custom 40.6% 47.1%
CyberPatrol Custom 48.6% 44.0%
CyberSitter Default 50.0% 32.8%
CyberSitter Custom 57.1% 36.2%
McAfee Young Teen 44.4% 37.5%
Net Nanny Level 2 41.7% 48.1%
Norton Default 35.3% 49.3%
Norton Custom 36.4% 49.7%
Verizon 37.0% 42.4%
8e6 42.1% 46.8%
SafeEyes 35.3% 40.4%
(category 5f)
not block, the
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Table 7. Estimated underblocking and overblocking of the results of
AOL, MSN, and Yahoo! searches. "Underblocking for results" is the
percentage of adult (category 50 search results that are not blocked.
"Overblocking for results" is the percentage of clean (category 1a)
search results that are blocked. "Domestic underblocking" is the
percentage of domestic webpages among adult search results that the
filters do not block. "Underblocking for searches" is, among searches
that retrieve any adult webpages, the percentage that retrieve at least
one adult webpage that is not blocked. "95% confidence limit" is a
conservative lower 95% confidence limit for underblocking for
searches.
Filter Under- Over- Domestic Under- 95%
blocking blocking Under- blocking confidence
for results for results blocking for searches limit
AOL 6.2% 12.5% 57.0% 15.6% 5.3%
Mature
Teen
MSN 21.4% 4.4% 86.1% 32.3% 20.9%
Porno-
graphy
MSN Teen 20.8% 5.8% 91.9% 28.1% 18.8%
Content 18.4% 6.4% 70.1% 46.2% 10.0%
Protect
Default
Content 20.4% 0.0% 62.1% 42.2% 25.4%
Protect
Custom
CyberPatrol 34.6% 0.4% 94.9% 65.6% 24.4%
Custom
Cyber- 11.2% 4.6% 33.8% 23.2% 11.2%
Sitter
Default
Cyber- 10.0% 5.3% 44.1% 20.1% 8.i%
Sitter
Custom
McAfee 14.2% 20.7% 80.7% 30.9% 10.4%
Young Teen
Net Nanny
Level 2
Norton
Default
Norton
28.1%
42.1%
43.4%
3.7% 79.4% 36.6%
4 1 ___ __ __
0.8%
0.0%
85.3%
20.8%
51.6% 49.3%
85.6% :56.1% 54.3%
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Filter Under- Over- Domestic Under- 95%
blocking blocking Under- blocking confidence
for results for results blocking for searches limit
Custom
Verizon 23.1% 1.3% 80.9% 41.6% 31.4%
8e6 7.3% 7.5% 78.o% 23.4% 11.7%
SafeEyes 13.7% 1.9% 87.8% 29.8% 14.9%
Table 8. Underblocking and estimated overblocking for the results of
Wordtracker searches. "Underblocking for results" is the percentage
of adult (category 5f) search results that are not blocked.
"Overblocking for results" is the percentage of clean (category ia)
search results the filter blocks. "Domestic underblocking" is the
percentage of domestic webpages among the adult search results that
the filters do not block. "Underblocking for searches" is, among the
searches that retrieve any adult webpages, the percentage that retrieve
at least one adult webpage that is not blocked. Overblocking was
estimated from a random sample of clean search results.
Underblocking was determined from all the adult search results.
Filter Underblocking Overblocking Domestic Underblocking
for results for results Underblocking for searches
AOL 1.3% 19.6% 69.2% 4.3%
Mature
Teen
MSN 2.7% 13.3% 86.1% 8.2%
Porno-
graphy
MSN 2.6% 13.7% 83.1% 8.3%
Teen
Content 7.5% 12.4% 84.1% 23.1%
Protect
Default
Content 8.1% 7.8% 84.9% 25.3%
Protect
Custom
Cyber 3.9% 9.2% 86.4% 10.1%
Patrol
Custom
Cyber- 1.4% 19.9% 69.3% 5.1%
Sitter
Default
Cyber- 2.9% 18.2% 84.0% 9.4%
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Filter Underblocking Overblocking Domestic Underblocking
for results for results Underblocking for searches
Sitter
Custom
McAfee 2.8% 32.8% 70.7% 9.3%
Young
Teen
Net 12.6% 9.5% 82.9% 34.4%
Nanny
Level 2
Norton 9.9% 4.8% 79.4% 25.2%
Default
Norton 10.2% 2.9% 79.4% 25.9%
Custom
Verizon 4.4% 16.1% 67.9% 15.0%
8e6 3.4% 25.1% 93.0% 10.3%
SafeEyes 2.0% 16.5% 96.6% 6.4%
Table 9. Estimated percentage of nominally free adult entertainment
(category 50 foreign webpages that have commercial ties to the
United States.
Data Source "free" adult webpages with
commercial ties to the U.S.
Google index 90.3%
MSN index 89.8%
AOL, MSN, and Yahoo! search results 88.2%
Wordtracker search results 95.9%
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